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D I S K U S S I O N 
U S E S O F H I S T O R Y F O R P O L I T I C A L L E G I T I M A T I O N BY 
C O M M U N I S T R E G I M E S 
Some Reflections on Eva Schmidt-Hartmann's article' 
By Fred Eidlin 
Eva Schmidt-Hartmann perceives changes in historical writing in Czechoslovakia 
as a reflection of the regime's views on the purposes of historiography; she also adds 
some theoretical reflections on legitimation. Dr Schmidt-Hartmann is extremely in-
formative in her interpretation of the Czechoslovak communist regime's evolving 
policy on historiography. Unfortunately her analysis ignored the broader context of 
the role of history in legitimating regimes in generál; in addition, she does not explain 
how the legitimacy of communist regimes differs from the legitimation of regimes in 
generál. The author does not define "legitimation" in concrete terms. For example, to 
whom are these legitimating historical writings addressed? What does legitimation 
mean in the political and sociological sense? What concrete political results (if any) 
does this legitimating history actually have? To what extent do communist regimes 
simply tolerate changes in historical writing, and to what extent do they plan and ac-
tively encourage such changes? Why is legitimation even necessary in a communist 
regime as long as the power systém remains intact? 
It is important to bear in mind the ignorance of ordinary people about very impor-
tant historical personalities and events, and to ask: what is the nature of the audience 
and how great is their knowledge? This páper proposes to make a few remarks about 
the problém of legitimacy in generál, the problém of history as legitimation, and speci-
fically, history as legitimation in communist regimes. 
The term legitimacy can be used in several senses. Sometimes it is used in a norma-
tive-philosophical sense. A legitimate government wields power because it has the 
right to do so. Its power is just since it comes from God or from the people, or because 
it is used for just ends. However, legitimacy can also be used in a purely descriptive, 
morally neutral sense, that is, to ref er to the actual grounds on which people accept the 
authority of governments. Max Weber's categories of traditional, charismatic, and 
rational authority imply no judgment about the ethics of accepting authority. Adolf 
Hitler and Jesus Christ both possessed charismatic legitimacy. Legal-rational legiti-
macy serveš equally well as a f actor helping to explain both the Gulag under Stalin and 
respect for civil liberties by American bureaucrats. 
1 See BohZ 29/2 (1988), pp. 300-324. 
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Legitimac y in th e normativ e sense coincide s with legitimac y in th e descriptive , 
sociologica l sense since on e of th e reason s peopl e actuall y accep t authorit y is because 
the y believe it to be legitimat e in a mora l sense. Th e qualit y of th e mora l reasonin g tha t 
leads peopl e to see authorit y as legitimat e differs greatly. Ther e are also considerabl e 
difference s in th e kind s of premise s tha t are perceived as moral . Thi s is, of course , what 
muc h of politica l conflic t is abou t -  conflic t over mora l principle s between peopl e 
having to co-exis t in th e same civil society. 
What make s histor y so importan t in th e legitimac y of regimes is tha t histor y no t onl y 
describe s ho w states and nation s cam e int o being, it is also constitutiv e of states and 
nations . I t contain s account s of exploit s of rulers , argument s over constitutiv e princi -
ples, struggles for independence , threat s to nationa l unity , and conflict s with enemies . 
What Citizen s of states conside r worth y and unworth y depend s upo n th e kind of statě 
or natio n the y would like to belon g to . Hence , on e person' s her o is anothe r person' s 
traitor , on e person' s freedo m fighter is another' s terrorist . Since all historian s like to 
thin k of themselve s as objective („wie es eigentlic h gewesen ist"), conflic t is inevitable . 
All regimes use histor y for purpose s of legitimation , bu t communis t regimes legiti-
mize themselve s throug h a particula r philosoph y or theor y of history . Since commu -
nists have traditionall y heape d scorn on th e idea tha t a regime seeks legitimatio n 
throug h free election s th e importanc e attache d to histor y as legitimatio n is greate r tha n 
it is for othe r regimes. Moreover , thi s theor y of histor y purport s to be a scientific 
theory , laying claim to absolut e truth . Histor y teils us why it is bot h necessar y and 
good for th e part y to be in power , and since th e theor y is suppose d to be scientific , 
henc e objectively true , ther e is n o need to ask th e peopl e for thei r consen t to th e par -
ty's rule or policies . "If th e part y and th e peopl e don' t agree, " to cite Bertol t Brecht , 
"you have to chang e th e people. " Disagreemen t canno t be admitte d if th e objective 
trut h is alread y suppose d to be known . To go against histor y (which is seen to be pro -
gressive and good) is to place onesel f in th e service of reaction , henc e of evil. 
An oft-forgotte n componen t of legitimac y (in thi s mixed normative-descriptiv e 
sense) is th e authorit y which result s from respec t for f orce and th e belief tha t it can and 
will be used eff ectively, often togethe r with "might make s right " theorie s of justice, or 
argument s to th e effect tha t "what can be don ě is all we can realisticall y hop e for." 
Such views of justice have a lon g tradition , from Callicle s and Thrasymachu s to 
Hobbe s and Machiavelli . In thi s view of legitimacy , power is self-justifying. A regime 
loses its legitimacy , power is self-justifying. A regime loses its legitimac y when it loses 
power . Th e only sin for "might make s right " theorie s is weakness. When th e regime 
weakens or appear s to waeken (th e two often amoun t to th e same thing) , it loses th e 
"mandát e of heaven, " and will be deserte d at all levels -  from Citizen s to th e leader -
ship. Man y discussion s of legitimac y neglect thi s dimension . Thi s is in par t because 
"might make s right " theorie s of justice are no t currentl y fashionable . Ou r liberal 
societie s prefer to ignore th e strain in huma n natur e which admire s th e stron g and 
detest s th e weak. Americans , for example , choos e to forget, to paraphras e forme r 
Senato r S. I . Hayakaw a on th e Panam a Canal , tha t we stole ou r countr y from peopl e 
who , by ou r own norms , legally owned it . 
A secon d componen t of legitimac y is th e inevitable , at least partial , identificatio n of 
regime and statě . All regimes, even th e mos t pernicious , perfor m man y statě func-
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tions that are widely, if not universally, recognized as promoting justice and the public 
good - for instance keeping the peace, providing social Services, etc. Even the regimes 
of Hitler and Stalin performed such functions and thus enjoyed a certain legitimacy. 
Furthermore, all regimes are associated to some extent with the Symbols of the State, 
for example, leaders of governments appear with flags to thestrain of national anthems. 
They depict themselves as the natural fulfillment of the nation-state's history. It is not 
surprising that the Soviet-bloc states place such an emphasis on sport or that President 
Reagan made so much of the Olympics. Government and regime become so fused in 
people's minds that they often respond to feelings of patriotism expressed by other-
wise unpopulär political leaders. 
The explicit ideological principles which constitute the official theory of legitimacy 
are only a narrow subset of the total set of principles constituting the legitimacy of any 
regime. If the first two sets of principles are neglected, we cannot possibly have a 
theory of legitimacy that works to explain the various phenomena that lead us to try 
to understand legitimacy in its entirety. 
The role that the official theory of legitimacy plays differs according to the popula-
tion. For example, it may make no difference at all to the stability of the regime if the 
most of the population is indifferent, even hostile to the regime's official theory of 
legitimacy as long as that theory fulfills certain functions for the ruling class. The offi-
cial legitimizing ideology may assuage their consciences the unpleasant realities of the 
regime by demonstrating that they are justified by higher principles. 
Yet circumstances can and do arise in which it makes a big difference whether or not 
the official theory of legitimacy is valid in the eyes of the population. Regimes can and 
do ignore what the people think, but sometimes regimes have to call upon the people 
to make sacrifices, accept hardships, or to dedicate themselves to collective efforts in 
support of its goals. Hence, the widespread view in Soviet-type countries that, despite 
all the difficiences of communism, at least the evil of capitalism has been removed, no 
doubt contributes to the legitimacy of these regimes. 
Under Stalin's rule the regime asserted a normative theory of legitimacy which it im-
posed ruthlessly on the whole of society. The Stalinist regime did not try to persuade 
its peoples of the truth of this theory; it simply terrorized them into accepting the 
official theory as gospel and systematically suppressed criticism and all alternative 
views. At the height of Stalinism, there were, of course, many true communists. These 
people were called upon to believe difficult and unpleasant truths and behave in a way 
that would disturb the sensibilities of most people. For them, history provided backup 
to the ideology that made it possible to be obedient and believe themselves to be pre-
serving a modicum of cognitive and moral integrity. 
After Stalin's death and the decline of hardline communism, a substantial proportion 
of the communist movements throughout the world began to perceive Stalin as a crim-
inal madman, and with the emergence of multiple authoritative centers of commu-
nist ideology, the kind of history used as legitimation under Stalin no longer worked. 
Without all-pervasive fear, with even loyal communists forced to become more sophis-
ticated in their political thinking, the kind of crude control and manipulation of 
history characteristic of Stalinism became less and less practicable. As the ideology 
that had bound the communist rank and file to blind, unquestioning acceptance of the 
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policie s of th e rulin g elitě weakened , historica l interpretatio n naturall y had to be in-
creasingly promote d by argumen t rathe r tha n imposed . As historiograph y become s 
mor e sophisticate d and historian s mor e familiär with th e behavio r of th e regime, it be-
come s increasingl y difficult for th e partisan s of a monolithi c regime to decid e on th e 
criteri a necessar y for a tota l contro l and manipulatio n of history . Some historian s obc-
dientl y strive to produc e regime-legitimatin g historiography ; but histor y has shown 
tha t some communis t historian s try to chang e and even to challeng e the official part y 
line, in orde r to justify thei r doubl e role as communist s and professiona l historians . 
Like th e Roma n Catholi c Churc h and the Inquisition , and othe r authoritaria n 
systems of th e past , as th e communis t regimes have mellowed the y have increasingl y 
mad e use of othe r source s of legitimatio n to Supplemen t th e weak point s in thei r 
orthodoxy . As Max Weber has noted , "the transition s between orientatio n to an orde r 
from motive s of traditio n or of expedienc y on the on e han d to th e čase where on the 
othe r a belief in its legitimac y is involved, are naturall y cmpiricall y gradual." 2 Thi s 
hclp s us make sense of th e apparentl y contradictionar y observation s brough t ou t so 
clearly in D r Schmidt-Hartmann' s article : communis t historian s have no t totall y ab-
abandone d th e fundamental s of communis t ideology while recognizin g th e significant 
change s tha t have taken place in the use of histor y for purpose s of legitimatio n in com -
munis t regimes. 
2 Weber , Max: Legitimat e Orde r and Types of Authority . In : Talcot t E. Shi ls , Kaspar 
D . Nacge l e , and Jcsse R. P i t t s (eds.) : Theorie s of Society: Foundation s of Moder n 
Sociologica l Theory . New York 1962, p. 230. 
